Modern aircraft may employ multiple computers to perform a variety of tasks, including acquiring information, or controlling systems associated with a plurality of functions, such as for instance, flight control, navigation, health, maintenance functions and/or other suitable function. For flight-critical applications redundancy and fail-tolerance may be required due in part to the potential impact of failures.
Redundant failover control systems may require a supervisor that monitors system health and/or the functional state of the system, and prevents non-functioning and/or malfunctioning computing nodes from corrupting the integrity of the system. In particular, the supervisor can grant control to one or more computing nodes and remove control from one or more non-functioning and/or malfunctioning computing nodes. In this manner, if one computing node fails, a standby computing node can be granted authority to control the system without an overall failure of the system. Such redundancy may be difficult to add to control systems that were originally designed for non-redundant computing nodes. For instance, implementing redundancy techniques in an aircraft that is not wired, setup or otherwise adapted to handle system supervisors for redundant control systems can require a major overhaul of the aircraft systems.